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-In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STANTON TRANSPORTATION COM-
PANY, a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
CONTINENTAL EMSCO COMPANY, 
a division of YOUNGSTOWN SHEET 
AND TUBE COMPANY, a corpora-
tion, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARVIN DAVIS, JACK DAVIS, 
JEAN DAVIS and JOAN PRES-
TON, partners, doing business under 
the firm name of DAVIS OIL COM-
PANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. i 
Case No. 
8951 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will sometimes be designated in this brief 
as follows: Plaintiff and appellant, Stanton Transporta-
tion Company, as "Stanton," plaintiff, Continental Emsco 
Company, a division of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Com-
pany, as "Emsco," and defendants and respondents, Marvin 
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Davis, Jack Davis, Jean Davis and Joan Preston, partner, 
doing business under the firm name of Davis Oil Compan; 
as "Davis." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal involves a very narrow question. The prol 
lem is simply whether the trial court erred in ruling th~ 
Stanton was not entitled to a mechanic's lien under tb 
Utah mechanics' lien statute for work performed in tram 
porting an oil well drilling rig to a drilling site where 1 
was used to drill an oil well. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no serious dispute as to the facts related t 
the issue presented on this appeal. The trial court helm 
found upon all of the essential facts, which findings ar 
not here objected to by Davis. Record references will therE 
fore for the most part be to the findings of the court bE 
low. References to the clerk's files will be designated a 
"R." and to the transcript of the evidence of the hearin 
on September 20, 1957, as "T.R.A." and to the transcrii 
of the evidence of the hearing on November 5 and 6, 195' 
as "T.R.B." 
Stanton Transportation Company is a corporation 01 
ganized and existing under the laws of the State of Colt 
rado and authorized to do business in the State of Utah~ 
a common carrier of equipment and supplies used in drilliiJ 
oil and gas wells (R. 78). The Davis Oil Company is 
partnership consisting of Marvin Davis, Jack Davis, Jea 
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3 
Davis and Joan Preston, which is engaged in the business of 
drilling oil and gas wells and related activities. Davis was at 
all times herein material the owner of an oil and gas lease 
covering the following described property in San Juan 
County, State of Utah: 
"The Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quar-
ter of Section 27, Township 41 South, Range 24 
East of the Salt Lake Meridian." 
On December 19, 1956, Davis entered into a contract 
with Walker-Wilson Drilling Company, oil and gas drilling 
contractors, whereby Walker-Wilson agreed to drill an oil 
and gas well for Davis on the premises covered by the oil 
and gas lease referred to above (R. 78). At the time the 
parties entered into this contract, it was contemplated that 
the drilling rig was to be on the new location and ready 
to drill on or before December 25, 1956. The drilling rig 
which was to be used had been dismantled and stacked at 
a former drilling site located approximately 36 miles south-
east of Hayden, Colorado. In order to reach the location 
where the rig had been stacked, it was necessary to travel 
over 30 miles on unimproved roads and there was several 
feet of snow on the ground where the rig had been stacked. 
The total distance from the old site to the new site was 
496 miles. In order to reach the new site it was necessary 
to travel over another 42 miles of unimproved roads and 
ford the San Juan River. Some of the individual items 
which had to be transported weighed as much as 40,300 
pounds (R. 79). Both Davis and Walker-Wilson knew that 
in order to drill the oil and gas well it would be necessary to 
obtain specially designed cranes and trucks to transport the 
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drilling rig to the new site and to assist in erecting the 
drilling equipment thereon. Their contract specifically pro-
vided that Walker-Wilson was to obtain the necessary equip-
ment and that Davis was to pay for the cost of transporting 
the drilling rig to the new site and erecting it thereon (R. 
78, 79). 
Because of the tremendous weights involved and the 
extremely rough terrain which had to be traversed, it was 
necessary to use specially designed trucks and equipment 
and men specially trained in the transporting of oil well 
drilling equipment. Stanton owns equipment designed to 
make such moves and employs men who are trained in this 
type of work (R. 79). It has been engaged in the business 
of transporting such equipment in the intermountain area 
since 1926 (T.R.A. 7). 
Walker-Wilson entered into a contract with Stanton 
whereby Stanton agreed to move the drilling rig and other 
equipment necessary to drill the oil well from the old site 
to the new site and to assist in erecting the drilling rig and 
preparing the new site so that an oil well could be drilled 
thereon. Pursuant to said agreement, Stanton transported 
the drilling rig from the old site to the new location. In 
so doing, Stanton used 23 trucks and approximately 30 men. 
In order to erect the drilling rig and prepare the drilling 
site so that an oil well could be drilled thereon, it is neces-
sary to use winches, cranes and other special equipment 
such as that owned by Stanton. Before the drilling equip-
ment could be loaded at the old location, in many cases it 
was necessary to use winches and cranes to break the equip-
ment loose from the frozen ground. After they reached the 
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drilling site, Stanton's men and equipment were used to 
erect the superstructure, to lift draw works to the drilling 
floor, install mud tanks and do other work in preparing the 
drilling rig and equipment so that it could be used to drill 
an oil well. Without Stanton's men and equipment it would 
have been impossible to have erected the drilling rig or to 
have drilled an oil well on the Davis lease (R. 79, 80). 
All of the equipment had been moved to the new site, 
the drilling rig had been erected and was ready to start 
drilling on December 25, 1956. The drilling rig was used 
in drilling an oil well which was completed as a producer 
on or about February 27, 1958, on premises described above 
(R. 18, 80, T.R.B. 21). 
The value of work and labor performed and services 
rendered by Stanton in moving the drilling rig and other 
equipment to the new site was $10,984.64. The value of 
work and labor performed and services rendered by Stan-
ton in erecting the drilling rig and preparing the site for 
drilling was $1,244.50. These charges are fair and reason-
able for the work and labor performed and the services 
rendered and are made in accordance with Stanton's tar-
iffs which are on file with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. Walker-Wilson was billed for said amounts but all 
attempts to collect said charges have failed and the full 
amount is now due and owing (R. 80). 
The contract between Davis and Walker-Wilson in-
volved more than $500.00 but Davis did not obtain a bond 
for the protection of mechanics and materialmen from 
Walker-Wilson in accordance with the provisions of Section 
14-2-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (T.R.A. 4). 
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Stanton filed a notice of lien for the above stated 
amounts with the County Recorder of San Juan County on 
March 12, 1957, and commenced action on June 26, 1957, 
to foreclose its mechanic's lien andjor to obtain a personal 
judgment against the respondents for the amount of its 
claims pursuant to the provisions of Section 14-2-2, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (R. 1-4). Stanton caused notice to 
be published to lien claimants and Continental-Emsco Com-
pany, a division of the Youngstown Sheet and Tube Com-
pany, appeared, presented its lien claim and was made a 
party plaintiff. Continental-Emsco obtained a judgment 
against Davis, from which Davis has appealed and which 
has been consolidated with Stanton's appeal for the con-
venience of the court. No further discussion of the Davis 
appeal and the problems related to Continental-Emsco will 
be mentioned in this brief. 
On September 13, 1957, Stanton entered into a stipula-
tion with Davis whereby Stanton released its lien claim 
which was the subject matter of the action with the under-
standing that if the trial court should adjudge and decree, 
that except for said release Stanton would be entitled to 
a lien upon the property of Davis and would be entitled to 
foreclose said lien, and if upon the judgment becoming 
final and after all appellate procedures had been exercised 
or waived, Davis did not forthwith pay the principal amount 
of the judgment with interest accrued thereon as determined 
by the court, then judgment could be entered on Stanton's 
motion in its favor against the surety named in the cor-
porate surety bond which respondents filed with the court 
(R. 26-28). 
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Under the forefoing state of facts, the trial court found 
that Stanton was entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value 
of services rendered and labor performed in erecting the 
drilling rig and preparing the site for drilling and also to 
a personal judgment against the individual partners for 
this amount for failure to obtain a bond from Walker-Wil-
son in accordance with the provisions of Section 14-2-1. 
The court also found that Stanton was not entitled to 
a mechanic's lien for the value of the services rendered 
and work performed in transporting the drilling rig to the 
new site since this did not constitute the performance of 
work for the prospecting, developing, preservation or work-
ing of an oil and gas well within the meaning of the Utah 
mechanics' lien statute. It is from this finding that Stanton 
appeals. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
ONE WHO TRANSPORTS DRILLING EQUIP-
MENT TO SITE WHERE IT IS USED TO DRILL 
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A MECHAN-
IC'S LIEN FOR VALUE OF WORK PER-
FORMED UNDER UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN 
STATUTE. 
(a) Legislative History and Wording of Statute 
Support This Conclusion. 
(b) Cases From Other Jurisdictions Have Held 
That Transportation is a Lienable Item 
Under Mechanics' Lien Statutes Which Con-
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tain Language Much More Restrictive Than 
That Contained in the Utah Statute. 
(c) Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is to be Con-
strued Liberally to Effect Object of Statute. 
(d) Public Policy Favors the Granting of Me-
chanics' Liens to Persons Who Perform 
Work Such as That Performed by Stanton. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
ONE WHO TRANSPORTS DRILLING EQUIP-
MENT TO SITE WHERE IT IS USED TO DRILL 
AN OIL WELL IS ENTITLED TO A MECHAN-
IC'S LIEN FOR VALUE OF WORK PER-
FORMED UNDER UTAH MECHANICS' LIEN 
STATUTE. 
(a) Legislative History and Wording of Statute 
Support This Conclusion. 
The primary question before the court on this appeal 
is whether the Utah legislature in enacting Section 38-1-3, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, intended that one who renders 
service or performs work in transporting oil well drilling 
equipment to a site where it is used to drill an oil well is 
entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work per-
formed. This is the first time the question has been before 
this court ; it is of extreme importance because of the tre-
mendous growth of the oil and gas industry in the State of 
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Utah during the past few years and the indications that it 
will continue to grow in the future. 
The Utah statute expressly provides that one who per-
forms. work for the development of an oil well shall be 
entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work per-
formed. We have found no other mechanics' lien statute 
which contains a provision relating to oil and gas wells as 
broad as the provision which appears in the Utah statute. 
Therefore, cases from other jurisdictions having different 
statutes are of little help in construing the Utah statute 
and we must rely to a large extent on the wording of the 
statute itself and upon its legislative history in determin-
ing the legislative intent. 
The statute provides as follows : 
"38-1-3. Those entitled to lien-What May Be 
Attached-Lien on Ores Mined.-Contractors, sub-
contractors and all persons performing labor upon, 
or furnishing materials to be used in, the construc-
tion or alteration of, or addition to, or repair of, any 
building, structure or improvement upon land; all 
foundry men and boiler makers ; all persons per-
forming labor or furnishing materials for the con-
struction, repairing or carrying on of any mill, man-
ufactory or hoisting works; all persons who shall do 
work o!o furnish materials for the prospecting, de-
velopment, preservation or working of any mining 
claim, mine, quarry, oil or gas well, or deposit; and 
licensed architects and engineers and artisans who 
have furnished designs, plats, plans, maps, specifica-
tions, drawings, estimates of cost, surveys or super-
intendence, or who have rendered other like pro-
fessional service, or bestowed labor, shall have a 
lien upon the property upon or concerning whick 
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they have rendered service, performed labor or fur-
nished materials, for the value of the service ren-
dered, labor performed or materials furnished by 
each respectively, whether at the instance of the 
owner or of any other person acting by his authority 
as agent, contractor or otherwise. Such liens shall 
attach only to such interest as the owner may have 
in the property, but the interest of a lessee of a 
mining claim, mine or deposit, whether working 
under bond or otherwise, shall for the purposes of 
this chaper include products mined and excavated 
while the same remain upon the premises included 
within the lease." (Emphasis Added.) 
It would seem clear that one who performs work in trans-
porting drilling equipment to an isolated site where it is 
used to drill an oil well has performed work for the de-
velopment of an oil well. This is the only reason that the 
work is done and without it there can be no oil well. The 
statute provides that those who have done such work shall 
have a lien upon the property upon or concerning which 
the work was done. The legislature thereby clearly ex-
pressed its intent that the work need not actually be per-
formed upon the property so long as it is work which con-
cerns the development of an oil well which is drilled on 
the property. 
The legislative history of the statute supports the con-
clusion that the Utah legislature intended that persons 
who perform work such as that performed by Stanton 
should be protected. The Utah mechanics' lien statute has 
contained substantially the same provisions since 1894. 
Laws of the Territory of Utah, 1894, Chapter XLI. How-
ever, prior to 1933, there was no specific provision in the 
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11 
statute relating to oil wells. In 1933 the statute was 
amended to give mechanics' liens to all persons who shall 
do work or furnish materials for the prospecting, develop-
ment, preservation or working of any mining claim, mine, 
quarry, oil or gas well or deposit. Rev. Stat. Utah, 1933, 
Section 52-1-3. Prior to 1933, the statute gave liens only 
upon property upon which the parties named therein had 
rendered service, performed labor or furnished materials. 
At the same time the statute was amended to specifically 
provide for oil and gas wells, its coverage was broadened to 
give liens not only upon property upon which services had 
been rendered, labor performed or materials furnished but 
also to give liens on property concerning which said activi-
ties had been performed. It is important to note that though 
the rest of the statute remained substantially the same, 
these two additions were made at the same time. The fact 
that these two changes were made at the same time was no 
mere coincidence. The legislature must have realized that 
in the development, preservation and working of an oil and 
gas well there are many activities that must be performed 
such as transporting drilling equipment to isolated well 
sites which might not technically be considered services 
rendered or work or labor performed upon the particular 
property but are certainly services rendered or work per-
formed concerning the property and that this work is just 
as essential to the development of an oil well as the work 
which is performed upon the property. By inserting the 
word concerning, the legislature undoubtedly intended that 
the parties rendering such services or performing such 
work should be protected even though the work or services 
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12 
were not actually rendered or performed upon the prop-
erty. 
It should also be noted that the provisions of Section 
38-1-3 which give liens to those who construct, alter, add 
to or repair any building, structure or improvement on 
land provides that those who "perform labor upon" shall 
have a lien whereas the provision pertaining to oil wells 
gives a lien to all persons "who shall do work for" the pros-
pecting, development, preservation or working of any oil 
and gas well. Certainly the legislature did not intend to be 
more restrictive in granting liens to those doing work for 
the development or working of oil by providing that those 
who "shall do work for" shall have a lien instead of limit-
ing it only to those "who perform labor upon." On the 
contrary, the provision regarding oil and gas wells is much 
broader. It includes the activities covered by the term "labor 
performed upon," but in addition it was intended to extend 
the coverage beyond that. That this is true is evidenced by 
the fact as noted above, that at the same time the legislature 
amended the mechanics' liens statute to specifically provide 
for oil and gas wells, it also extended the property upon 
which liens could be imposed from property upon which 
services had been rendered, labor performed or materials 
furnished to include property conce1-ning zclzich such activi-
ties had been directed. 
In this connection, the courts that have considered the 
difference between the words labor and work have almost 
universally held that the word work has a much more com-
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13 
prehensive meaning than labor. The Court in State v. Rose, 
125 La. 463, 51 So. 496, 497, said that: 
" * * * the word 'work' has a much more 
comprehensive meaning than the term 'labor' and 
has been thus defined: 'to exert one's self for a 
purpose, to put forth effort for the attainment of 
an object; to be engaged in the performance of a 
task, duty or the like.' The term as thus defined 
covers all forms of physical or mental exertions, or 
both combined, for the attainment of some object 
other than recreation or amusement. * * *" 
and the court in Silver v. Harriss, 165 La. 83, 115 So. 376, 
378, stated that: 
"* * * when the statute accords its bene-
fits to all persons, natural or artificial, who may 
have done any 'work' or performed any 'labor' it is 
clear that it recognizes the distinction between the 
terms and that the use of the former is intended to 
cover a broader field of activity than the use of the 
latter ; * * * " 
Again, it is no coincidence that these three changes 
appear together for the first time in 1933. The legislature 
must have realized that in the development of an oil well 
there is much work, such as transporting drilling equip-
ment to isolated drilling locations which technically might 
not be considered as labor performed upon the property. 
The legislature, therefore, specifically provided that all 
persons who do work for the development of an oil well 
shall have a lien upon the property concerning which they 
have performed the work. The statute certainly did not 
restrict the lien to one who has actually performed labor 
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upon the property otherwise the words "doing work for" or 
"concerning which" would have no meaning. 
(b) Cases From Other Jurisdictions Have Held 
That Transportation is a Lienable Item 
Under Mechanics' Lien Statutes Which Con-
tain Language Much More Restrictive Than 
That Contained in the Utah Statute. 
There are no cases that have considered the question 
of whether work performed in transporting drilling equip-
ment to a location where it is used to drill an oil well is 
a lienable item under the Utah statute. The Utah statute 
gives a lien to all persons who do work for the development 
of an oil well, upon the property concerning which their 
work is directed. We have found no other mechanics' lien 
statute which purports to give protection to such a large 
class of persons and no decisions on this question under 
statutes that are even roughly similar to the Utah statute.~. 
However, there are many cases where the courts have held 
that those who perform work in transporting equipment or 
supplies that are used in improving property are entitled 
to a mechanic's lien for the value of the work performed 
even though the mechanics' lien statutes involved were 
much more restrictive than the Utah statute. A discussion 
of the reasoning of the courts which have held that trans-
portation is a lienable item under more restrictive statutes 
may be of assistance in the instant case. 
We have found cases from only two jurisdictions where 
the courts have directly ruled on the question of whether 
a person who performs work in transporting drilling equip-
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ment to a well site is entitled to a mechanic's lien for the 
value of the work performed. The Oklahoma courts have 
held that such persons are entitled to a mechanic's lien 
while the Texas courts have held that they are not. Gray 
v. Magdalina Oil Co., 240 S. W. 683. It should be noted, 
however, that the Texas courts have held that their me-
chanics' lien statute is to be strictly construed. McClellen 
v. Haley, 237 S. W. 627, 629. This rule of construction is 
contrary to the majority rule and contrary to the rule 
adopted in Utah. U. C. A. 1953, Section 68-3-2. 
In Cleveland v. Hightower, 108 Okla. 84, 234 Pac. 614, 
the Oklahoma Supreme Court in construing a statute which 
provided that: 
"'* * * any person * * * who shall, 
under contract express or implied, with the owner 
of a leasehold for oil and gas. purposes * * * 
perform any labor in constructing or putting to-
gether any machinery used in drilling * * * 
shall have a lien,' * * * " 
held that one who performs work in transporting pipe and 
casing to an oil and gas leasehold is entitled to a mechanic's 
lien under the Oklahoma statute. In so holding, the court 
stated: 
"* * * why should the Legislature give a 
lien to the person who takes the casing when de-
livered upon the leasehold, screws the different 
joints together, lets them down into the well, as 
necessary for its operation and completion, which 
casing could not be on the leasehold but for the labor 
of the man who hauled it there, and at the same 
time deny the same character of protection to the 
laborer, the culmination of whose toil, though begun 
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off the premises, resulted in the delivery of the 
casing where it should play its part necessary for 
constructing and operating the machinery or equip-
ment for an oil well. * * *" 
Also see Hays Drilling Co. v. Sartain, 108 Okla. 181, 235 
Pac. 615, 617; Comm. Oil Corp. v. Lumpkin, 113 Okla. 158, 
241 Pac. 137; Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. McDowell, 119 Okla. 
77, 249 Pac. 717; Osage Oil & Refinery Co. v. Gromley, 23 
Okla. 186, 252 Pac. 37; Cont. Supply Co. v. George Grenan 
Co., 140 Okla. 221, 282 Pac. 598, to the same effect. 
The reasoning of the court in the Hightower case should 
also apply under the Utah statute. The language of the 
Utah statute is much broader than that used in the Okla-
homa statute which applies only to those who perform 
labor in constructing or putting together the machinery 
used in drilling the well while the Utah statute applies to 
anyone who does work for the development of the oil well. 
Although there are relatively few cases that have con-
sidered the question of the lienability of work performed 
in transporting drilling equipment, there are many that 
have considered the question of whether transportation for 
other purposes is a nenable item under statutes much more 
restrictive than the Utah statute. 
In Cashman v. R~sell, 33 Ariz. 451, 265 Pac. 606, the 
plaintiff brought an action to establish and foreclose a 
mechanic's lien on a mine and certain mining claims for 
the value of work performed in transporting machinery 
and supplies to the mine. The Arizona statute provided 
in part that "all miners, laborers and others who may 
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labor * * * in or upon any mine, or mining claim 
* * * shall have a lien upon the same for such sums as 
are unpaid." The court held that the plaintiff was entitled 
to a lien and in so doing stated that: 
"* * * The object of our lien statute is to 
prevent the owner of mines or mining claims from 
obtaining the labor of miners, laborers and others 
who may labor in the improvement of such mining 
property, or in extracting ores therefrom, without 
paying for such labor. 
"These lien statutes are remedial in their na-
ture and should receive a liberal construction to 
the end that they may accomplish what they were 
designed to do. 40 C. J. 51, § 11; Davis v. Mial, 86 
N. J. Law, 167, 90 A. 315, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 1028. 
"In construing our statute, we cannot obtain 
very much aid from the decisions of other courts 
because of the great dissimilarity of the statutes 
granting liens. However, even though the language 
in the different statutes may vary, a reading of 
them will satisfy one that they have the same gen-
eral object and purpose. Our effort is to find out, 
if possible, what laborers on mining properties the 
Legislature intended to protect by lien. It is very 
improbable that the Legislature intended to dis-
criminate as between persons who labor for an in-
dividual or a corporation engaged in working and 
developing mining property. It is hardly conceivable 
that it should have provided that miners who work 
in the mines and on them should be preferred as 
against those who are bringing to them the supplies 
necessary to prosecute their work, or those persons 
who, while not actually on or in the mines, are doing 
services without which the miners could not work or 
the mines operate. It would seem to us that the leg-
islative language should not be limited to persons 
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who labor only on and in the mining premises, but 
extended to all whose labor contributes directly and 
immediately to the mining operations and without 
which they could not very well be carried on. In 
such view, the plaintiff is clearly entitled to a lien 
for the hauling he did for the defendant, both to 
the mines and from the mines, * * * " 
The court in Fowler v. Pompelly, 25 Ky. L. R. 615, 76 
S. W. 173, in construing a statute which provided: 
"* * * 'A person who performs labor or 
furnishes rna terial in the erection, altering or re-
pairing a house * * * shall have a lien thereon, 
and upon the land upon which the said improve-
ment shall have been made.' * * *" 
stated that: 
"* * * It is conceded that the materialmen 
who furnished these articles to appellants to haul 
and the laborers and contractor who actually erected 
the building, have liens for the material furnished 
and the labor performed, yet it is claimed by the 
appellee that these appellants, who performed labor 
just as necessary to the erection of the buildings as 
the person who furnished the material or the per-
sons who nailed the lumber on the building, have 
no lien. We canot agree to this construction of the 
statute. In our opinion, under a proper construction 
of the statute, they are just as much entitled to lien 
for their services as any of the persons named." 
The Idaho Supreme Court in construing a statute which 
provided that: 
"* * * 'Every person performing labor 
upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the 
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construction, alteration or repair of, any mining 
claim, building, * * * or any other structure, 
* * * has a lien upon the same for the work or 
labor done. * * *' " 
held in Hill v. Twin Falls, etc., 22 Idaho 274, 125 Pac. 204, 
that a person who hauls cement from a railroad station to 
the site of a dam is entitled to a lien for his labor. In so 
holding, the court stated: 
"So, in the present case the labor and services 
of the respondents became a part of the construction 
of the dam to the same extent as the labor of any 
other individuals and gave the respondents the same 
right to a lien. The respondents hauled cement to 
the place of use for the purpose of use, and it was 
accepted by the appellant and so used in the con-
struction and as a part of the construction the same 
as any other material or any other labor contributing 
to the erection and improvement of said property. 
* * * There certainly can be no reason why 
any class or kind of labor, and it matters not what 
it is, which is intended to aid and enhance the con-
struction of any particular improvement, and is re-
ceived and used in such improvement, should not be 
and is not entitled to a lien upon such improved 
property under the statute of this state. * * *" 
It is clear that the language and reasoning applied by 
the courts in the cases cited above under statutes much more 
restrictive than the Utah statute should also apply in the 
instant case. The 'courts that have refused to recognize 
mechanics' liens for the value of work performed in trans-
porting supplies and equipment used in improving property 
have generally done so because of the wording of the par-
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ticular statute involved. Often the statutes are so worded 
as to give liens only to those who are upon the premises 
when the work is performed. However, even in these cases, 
the courts have given those who transport equipment or 
supplies liens under statutes that provide that only those 
who perform labor upon the property shall have liens. See 
McClain v. Hutton, 131 Cal. 132, 61 Pac. 273, 63 Pac. 182; 
McKeen v. Hasetine, 46 Minn. 426, 49 N. W. 195; Hill v. 
Newman, 38 Pa. 151, 80 An. D. 473. Where the courts have 
been unable to find that transportation is labor performed 
upon the property, because of the wording of the statute, 
they have often recognized a lien for the value of transpor-
tation services under the theory that it is part of the cost 
of materials furnished. Republic Nat. Bank & Trust Co. 
v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co., 68 F. 2d 445; American Lia,.. 
bility Surety Co. v. Bluefield Supply Co., 70 F. 2d 187; 
Fagan v. Brock Motor Co., (Mo.), 282 S. W. 135; Brace & 
H. Mill Co. v. Burbank, 87 Wash. 356, 151 Pac. 803; Wis-
consin Brick Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 164 Wis. 585, 160 N. W. 
1044. 
(c) Utah Mechanics' Lien Statute is to be Con-
strued Liberally to Effect Object of Statute. 
Mechanics' liens were never recognized by the common 
law and are in derogation thereof. 36 Am. Jur. 19, Mechan-
ics' Liens, Section 3. The Utah statute provides that: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has 
no application to the statutes of this state. The 
statutes establish the laws of this state respecting 
the subjects to which they relate, and their provi-
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sions and all proceedings under them are to be lib-
erally construed with a view to effect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice. * * *" 
Section 68-3-2, U. C. A., 1953. 
This is in accordance with the great weight of authority 
which holds that mechanics' lien statutes are to be construed 
liberally so as to effect the object of such statutes, which 
is to permit a lien upon premises where the owner has 
benefited by having the value of his property increased or 
improved as a result of labor or services rendered, work 
done, or materials furnished by another. It is based upon 
the principal of unjust enrichment and is designed to pro-
tect those who enhance the value of property of another 
and are not paid therefor. The statutes place the burden 
upon the owner of the property who benefits from the im-
provements to insure that those who make his enrichment 
~ossible are paid. To achieve this end, the mechanics' 
lien statutes are often supplemented as in Utah by statutes 
which require the owner to obtain a bond from the principal 
contractor for the protection of those who perform labor, 
render services, do work or furnish materials. If the owner 
fails to comply with this provision, he can be held per-
sonally liable for the amount due in addition to the rights 
which the claimant may acquire under the mechanics' lien 
statute. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in affirming 
a Utah Territorial Supreme Court decison holding that a 
superintendent of a mine was one who came within the 
purview of the Utah mechanics' lien statute stated: "Stat-
utes giving liens to laborers and mechanics for their work 
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and labor are to be liberally construed." Mining Co. v. 
Callins, 104 U. S. 176, affirming 2 Utah 219; Davis v. 
Alvord, 94 U. S. 545. 
In Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 Utah 241, 87 Pac. 
713, the Utah Supreme Court in construing the mechanics' 
lien statute then in effect quoted with approval the follow-
ing language from Boisot on Mechanics' Liens, Section 4: 
"The doctrine upon which the lien is founded 
is the consideration of natural justice, that a party 
who has enhanced the value of property by incor-
porating therein his labor or materials shall have 
a preferred claim on such property for the value 
of his labor and materials." 
(d) Public Policy Favors the Granting of Me-
chanics' Liens to Persons Who Perform 
Work Such as That Performed by Stanton. 
Development of the vast oil and gas resources of the 
western states depends upon continuous exploration and 
drilling programs. The leasehold interests such as held by 
Davis in the instant case are valueless unless wells can be 
drilled on the property covered by the leases. This often 
requires the drilling of wells in isolated locations, miles 
from any road. This problem is exemplified by the instant 
case where in order to reach the location it was necessary 
to ford the San Juan River and travel over 42 miles on 
unimproved roads. In such cases, before a well can be 
drilled, it is necessary to bulldoze roads into the location 
and prepare the site for the drilling rig. Due to the depth 
which such wells must be drilled, the drilling equipment 
is extremely heavy, some of the individual items which 
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23 
were transported in the instant case weighed as much as 
40,300 pounds. It must be remembered that often in order 
to reach the location it is necessary to traverse almost im-
possible terrain as any one who is familiar with the south-
eastern portion of the State of Utah can well imagine. 
After the drilling rig and other equipment are transported 
to the site, it is necessary to erect the rigs. During the 
drilling of the well, drill pipe, collars, casing, mud and in-
numerable other items of drilling equipment and supplies 
must be transported to the well site. In drilling an oil well 
it is necessary to use tremendous amounts of water. Often 
the drilling location is located miles from the nearest water 
supply and it is necessary to truck water to the location. 
In many cases, this involves round-the-clock operations. 
Specially designed trucks are used to make electrical logs 
of the wells, run cement and perform other operations 
which are absolutely essential to modern drilling methods. 
Is it possible to say that any of the forms of transpor-
tation noted above is not work performed for the develop-
ment of an oil well? Is it equitable to say that one should 
be entitled to a mechanic's lien for the value of his work 
while another should not? Should the merchant who sells 
supplies and transports them to the rig be allowed to in-
clude the cost of transportation and obtain a lien therefor 
while the person who trucks water to the site be prevented 
from obtaining a lien? Should the person who transports 
the casing which becomes an integral part of the well be 
entitled to lien for the value of his work while he transports 
the drill pipe which is just as essential in the development 
of a well be prevented from obtaining a lien? Should those 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
who have specially designed trucks which are used to run 
cement or log a well be entitled to include the cost of driving 
the truck to the weBsite as a part of their services and be en-
titled to a lien while he who transports the very drilling 
rig without which there would be no well be prevented 
from obtaining a lien? 
The answer to all of these questions is obviously no. 
The legislatures of the various states have long recognized 
the principle that one who has been enriched by having 
the value of his property increased through the work, labor, 
other services or materials furnished by a third party 
should be responsible for seeing that said persons are paid. 
It is for this reason that mechanics' lien statutes and stat-
utes which require property owners to obtain bonds from 
principal contractors protecting such persons or become 
personally liable have been enacted. 
The Utah legislature enacted legislation as early as 
1890 which gave a lien to those whose labor or materials 
increased the value of the property of another. Thereby 
recognizing the principle that the property owner who is 
enriched as a result of the labor of another should be the 
one who is primarily responsible for seeing that the one 
who made his enrichment possible is paid. The first Utah 
statutes gave liens only to those who were upon the prem-
ises· when the labor was performed. In 1933 the legisla-
ture recognized that in the development of oil wells, mines 
and other related activities it was necessary to have much 
work which was not actually performed upon the premises 
but without which such development would be impossible. 
There was no reason why the person whose work though 
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begun off the premises, was nevertheless absolutely essen-
tial for the development of such improvements as oil wells 
and mines should not receive the same protection as the 
person whose labor was actually performed on the premises. 
It was. for this reason that the legislature provided that 
all persons who do work for the development of an oil well 
shall be entitled to a lien upon the property concerning 
which their work was directed. 
CONCLUSION 
Stanton Transportation Company performed work in 
transporting drilling equipment to a well site located on 
property covered by an oil and gas lease owned by Davis 
Oil Company. This equipment was used to drill a produc-
ing oil well upon said premises. Without the work per-
formed by Stanton, it would have been impossible to de-
velop an oil well on this location. The Utah mechanics' lien 
statute gives a lien to all persons who do work for the de-
velopment of oil wells upon the property concerning which 
their work is directed. The only purpose of the work per-
f~rmed by Stanton was to develop an oil well on the subject 
premises. 
Public policy has long demanded that the property 
owner who is enriched as a result of the labor performed 
or materials furnished by another should be the one pri-
marily responsible for seeing that the one who performs 
such services is paid. Courts in other jurisdictions have 
recognized transportation as a lienable item under statutes, 
the coverage of which is much more narrow than that 
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given by the Utah statute. The language of the Utah stat-
ute is extremely broad and its legislative history indicates 
clearly that persons such as Stanton who perform work 
for the development of an oil well should be entitled to a 
lien for the value of the work performed. 
For the reasons cited above, we submit that the trial 
court was in error in ruling that Stanton was not entitled 
to a lien for the value of the work it performed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STERLING D. COLTON, 
For Van Cott, Bagley, 
Cornwall & McCarthy, 
ALVIN J. MEIKLEJOHN, JR., 
Of Counsel, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
and Appellant. 
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